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Amidst statutory and non-statutory calls for effective patient and public involvement
(PPI), questions continue to be raised about the impact of PPI in healthcare services.
Stakeholders, policy makers, researchers, and members of the public ask in what ways
and at what level PPI makes a difference. Patient experience is widely seen as an
important and valuable resource to the development of healthcare services, yet there
remain legitimacy issues concerning different forms of knowledge that members of the
public and professionals bring to the table, and related power struggles. This paper
draws on data from a qualitative study of PPI in a clinical commissioning group (CCG)
in the UK. The study looked at some of the activities in which there was PPI; this
involved researchers conducting observations of meetings, and interviews with staff and
lay members who engaged in CCG PPI activities. This paper explores power imbalances
when it comes to influencing the work of the CCG mainly between professionals and
members of public, but also between different CCG staff members and between different
groups of members of public. The authors conclude that a hierarchy of power exists,
with some professionals and public and lay members affordedmore scope for influencing
healthcare service development than others—an approach which is reflected in the ways
and extent to which different forms and holders of knowledge are viewed, managed,
and utilized.
Keywords: patient and public involvement, healthcare, power, hierarchy, influence, lay members, public members,
professionals
INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that quality in the delivery of healthcare is more than purely good clinical care.
Quality is now defined to include dimensions such as clinical effectiveness, safety, and patient-
centredness (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 2001).
The experience and voice of the patient has increasingly become integrated as a core dimension of
health care consultation and planning. The idea is that patient and public involvement will improve
quality and implementation of healthcare services, address population expectations and needs and
foster healthcare choices and shared decision-making (Boivin et al., 2010).
Patient and public involvement (PPI) in healthcare services has become an international
phenomenon over recent years in western and developing countries (Oliver et al., 2007). A
PPI working group created in 2007 by the Guideline International Network Patient and Public
Involvement Working Group (G-I-N PUBLIC) aims to support PPI globally in the development
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and implementation of clinical practice guidelines (Boivin
et al., 2010). The UK is viewed as one of the “pioneers”
in demonstrating a national commitment to public
involvement (Gauvin et al., 2010). Regulations stipulate
that all NHS organizations must have PPI in the planning,
development, and operational aspects of healthcare
services (Barnes and Schattan Coelho, 2009).
Statutory policy produces guidance on patient and public
participation for commissioners of health services (NHS
England, patient, and public participation policy)1. Statutory
guidance, however, is open to interpretation (Martin, 2008a)
which often results in contrasting approaches to PPI and
outcomes. Madden and Speed point out: “At its best, PPI
may have the potential for increased democratic accountability,
for improving health outcomes, and for addressing the
social determinants of health, through for example, improved
understanding of different cultures of research and engagements
with evidence. At its worst, however, PPI runs the risk of being
insignificant, tokenistic, and overly managerialist” (2017, p. 1).
Attempts to broaden and strengthen PPI continue in response
to calls for more effective involvement. Frameworks have been
developed for exploring the nature of PPI in the context
of different approaches used and the differences between
professionals and the public in relation to the challenges,
demands and expectations around PPI (e.g., Tritter, 2009; Gibson
et al., 2012). However, questions continue to be raised about the
level and impact of PPI in decision-making and more recently
research and literature has highlighted the importance addressing
various challenges associated to these issues (e.g., Mockford et al.,
2011; Staniszewska et al., 2011; Brett et al., 2012). Moreover,
whilst patient experience is viewed as an important and valuable
resource to the development of healthcare services, there are
concerns about the legitimacy of the type of knowledge that
patients andmembers of the public possess and are therefore able
to contribute to healthcare decision-making (Daykin et al., 2007;
Martin, 2008b; Boivin et al., 2010).
One of the challenges facing effective PPI relates to the
differences between professionals and patients and the public
in terms of motivations, expectations, and perceptions of PPI
(Rise et al., 2011). Calls have been made for “professionals and
users [. . . ] to reconceptualize the traditional category of patient to
one that understands that service users can contribute to service
planning and development” (Petsoulas et al., 2014, p. 10).
This paper stems from a study which set out to explore PPI in
a clinical commissioning group (CCG). Clinical commissioning
groups are clinically-led statutory NHS bodies. Since April
2013, following a shift in commissioning powers from the
former Primary Care Trusts, CCGs have held responsibility
for commissioning secondary and community care services
for their local populations. Clinical commissioning groups
control around two-thirds of the NHS budget. All general
practices in England are legally obliged to be a member of a
CCG (Naylor et al., 2013; p. ix).
1Available online at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/publication/patient-and-public-
participation-policy/ (accessed September 10, 2018).
The principles of PPI have been formally incorporated
within the structure of CCGs through regulations which
stipulate that the governing body of each CCG must include
eight statutory roles, of which two must be occupied by lay
members. Involvement from public and patient representatives
is emphasized within reformed commissioning structures
and procedures which require CCGs to liaise with Health
and Well-being Boards to plan and deliver services.
Healthwatch representatives form part of these Health and
Well-being Boards and are described as the “patient voice” or
“consumer champion” (Department of Health, 2012).
The CCG PPI study revealed that a key dimension of PPI
related to a system of stratification within which individuals
occupied positions that reflected their capacity to influence the
work of the CCG. Stratification systems are a common feature
of developed societies where a dominant hierarchy exists to
maintain stability. As such, stratification engenders inequalities
around power and other valued resources (Cheng et al., 2013).
Raphael and Bryant (2015) provide a useful characterization of
stratification: “In addition to affecting the social determinants of
health, stratification is related to the power and ability of those
so stratified to influence public policy” (Raphael and Bryant,
2015, p. 248).
Stratification constitutes a hierarchy which distinguishes
between individuals on the basis of power to influence.
Variations in power status within healthcare structures are
widely documented, with reference to paid professionals
occupying more dominant positions than members of
public (e.g., Martin, 2008b; Ocloo and Matthews, 2016).
Foucault (1972) describes power as typically residing in
medical structures, institutions, and discourses. The growth of
PPI and the resulting increased potential it brings for patients
and the public to have a voice in healthcare decision-making
might potentially counteract this view. However, the question
in reality is whether the growth of PPI translates into patients
and the public having power to influence healthcare service
development. Themes of power, dominance, and hierarchy are
prevalent analytical terms in sociological studies of health care,
and Foucault’s concepts around power and knowledge can be
applied to traditional views of the doctor-patient interactions.
In historical contexts, Foucault theorized power of knowledge
as embedded in dominant discourses and systems, and viewed
critiques of knowledge and truths as both pervasive and
dominant. Under such an analysis of power and hierarchy,
the medical profession maintained the upper hand by having
greater knowledge, expertise, prestige, organizational support,
and stability. The patient/public with historically less power such
as women, minority groups, and the poor would have been
more vulnerable playing “second fiddle” to medical authority and
lacked the resources to question medical decisions or challenge
prescribed care (Foucault, 2003). However, as the modern day
patient/public has become better informed about illnesses and
forms of treatment, they have become self-advocates for their
own health care and perhaps, in this sense, as a consequence have
acquired the potential to narrow the power disparity.
There are various definitions of power that have emanated
from different theoretical and conceptual perspectives. A neutral
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meaning of power cannot be found, since the meaning of power
is always embedded in a theoretical context (Guzzini, 2005). It
is not the intention here to provide an in-depth discussion of
the different perspectives of the meaning of power. However, one
example of a classical sociological concept of power comes from
Weber’s definition, presented by Rutar (2017):
“For him (Weber, 1978 [1922], p. 53) power is, as is well known,
“the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be
in a position to carry out his ownwill despite resistance, regardless
of the basis on which this probability rests.” This can be, and
usually is, further condensed. Social power is simply the ability
of agent A to influence agent B in such a way (with the help of
either personal or impersonal means) that agent B does something
he/she otherwise would not have done, or does not do something
he/she otherwise would have done (cf. Dahl, 1961)” (2017, p. 153).
METHODS
The aim of this paper is to explore the differences between
individuals in their potential to influence the work of the CCG
and to consider these differences in terms of the positions they
occupy in a hierarchical structure.
The use of the term “public member” refers to a member of
public; the term “lay member” refers to a member of public who
is a member of a formal PPI group.
Study Design
This study forms part of a wider research project exploring PPI
in a CCG in England. It is a single case study set in a large,
diverse inner city. The study used a qualitative approach drawing
on ethnographic methods. Ethnographic research “seeks to
understand people’s opinions, beliefs, motivations, interactions,
and the structures in which they are involved or are influenced by,
and above all, the social contexts in which people live and interact
[. . . ]. [Ethnographic research] observes what people do in their
everyday practices, and tries to understand the motivations and
explanations for people’s actions.” (Potrata, 2005, p. 131).
PPI in the CCG comprised GP surgery patient groups, public
consultations, public attendance at CCG board public meetings,
and various clinical reference groups (CRGs). Our study explored
two of these activities: (i) CCG board public meetings and (ii) the
CRG for PPI (PPI CRG). These settings were identified by a PPI
lay member of the CCG board who was involved in developing
the study.
Data Collection
Data were collected over an 18 month period between February
2014 and August 2015 and methods comprised observations,
informal interactions, interviews, and a focus group.
Observations
Researchers made handwritten notes of observations which were
entered as soon as possible after each meeting onto a data
collection tool (form) that was designed for the study. The tool
enabled researchers to document the type of meeting, number of
people present and their roles, diagram/notes on physical layout,
agenda items discussed, and researchers’ general notes.
Clinical commissioning group board public meetings
CCG board public meetings were held monthly on a weekday
morning in a CCG meeting room. Observations of 14 meetings
were conducted. Meetings lasted two and a half hours; this
constituted ∼35 h of observation. Researchers considered it
necessary to carry out this number of observations because
meetings covered a range of topics which often varied from
month to month. This generated attendance from different
public and staff members depending on the agenda items
under discussion.
The board was made up of 15 voting members and
six non-voting members. Voting members included two lay
members, one with responsibility for governance and one
with responsibility for PPI. Other voting members comprised
clinicians (GPs and a secondary care doctor), a registered nurse
and managers of finance/accounts. Non-voting board members
included directors of services and a Healthwatch representative.
Patient and public involvement clinical reference group
meetings
PPI CRGmeetings took place bimonthly on a weekday afternoon
in a CCG meeting room. Observations of 10 of these meetings
were carried out. Meetings lasted ∼3 h, amounting to 30 h
of observation.
The PPI CRG was relatively newly developed and observing
10 meetings over an 18 month period enabled researchers to
gain insight into the nature and progression of the group
and the relationships within. There were 11 lay members
of the group, made up of individuals and community
representatives, voluntary and community sector representatives,
locality representatives, and a lay member chair of the group
(who was also one of the voting lay members on the CCG
board). The group comprised five staff members: a clinical
lead, a PPI manager, an engagement manager, an administrator
and a CCG board member with a remit for PPI. The CCG
board member’s attendance reduced regarding the amount of
time spent in meetings and ceased altogether less than half
way through observations. This was reportedly because their
attendance was seen by the CCG as necessary only during the
early stages of the group’s development to provide support until
the group had become more established.
Meeting attendance numbers varied (in terms of both staff and
lay member attendance), with a minimum of fivemembers in just
one meeting observed and a maximum of 15 in another.
Informal Interactions
Informal interactions between researchers and meeting attendees
often occurred following CCG board public meetings and PPI
CRG meetings. Interactions provided valuable insight into the
views, beliefs and experiences of public, lay and staff members in
terms of the respective meeting and PPI itself. Handwritten notes
of interactions were added to the relevant observation notes on
the data collection tool.
Interviews
A total of 14 interviews, both face to face and by telephone
(according to the preference of interviewees), were carried out
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TABLE 1 | Number of interviews conducted with CCG staff and public/lay
members.
CCG staff Public/lay members
Board members n = 3 Public member attendee of
CCG board meeting
n = 1
PPI CRG
lead/manager
n = 2 PPI CRG lay members
(inc lay chair board member)
n = 8
with staff, public, and lay members. These comprised three with
CCG board members, one with a public member who regularly
attended CCG board public meetings, two with PPI CRG staff,
and eight with PPI CRG lay members (Table 1).
Interview schedules for public and lay members addressed
the following areas: how and why they became involved in the
CCG and associated expectations; the PPI role; representation as
a lay/public member; CCG support for and commitment to PPI;
impact/influence of PPI. Public members who attended CCG
board public meetings were also asked about PPI in meetings and
the structure and content of meetings. Staff member interview
schedules explored issues around the importance, benefits and
challenges, and influence of PPI.
Focus Group
A focus group took place 12 months into data collection activities
with five PPI CRG lay members. In particular, discussion focused
on issues around representation. Three focus group lay members
also took part in the interviews.
Data Analysis
Analysis was an iterative process carried out at different
stages starting from the collection of data during observations
through to writing up findings of the study. Analysis of
observation and interaction notes and interview and focus group
transcripts took place using a thematic framework approach
(Pope et al., 2000). Data were coded into themes from which
interpretations were generated. This process was carried out
inductively, identifying key issues, concepts and themes emerging
from data, and deductively in line with interview and focus
group schedules. During data collection activities and early
coding we observed that power imbalance was a key feature
within the different data sources: observations of meetings,
interviews, informal interactions and the focus group. Ongoing
coding and analysis generated the themes presented in Table 2.
The three layers represent the final set of themes and codes
underpinning our analysis: Overarching theme (power, control,
PPI impact); Organizing theme (PPI, power to influence, time,
meeting arrangements, recruitment, knowledge, accountability,
and feedback); Components of organizing theme.
Two researchers independently carried out analysis of half
the data. Following discussion and agreement about the coding
and subsequent themes identified, one researcher continued the
process across the other half of data. Papers and documents from
meetings observed were collated and used for reference during
data analysis.
TABLE 2 | Data coding themes.
Overarching
theme
Organizing theme Components of organizing theme
Power Power over PPI Type of involvement
Level of involvement
Timing of involvement
Place of PPI
PPI CRG role unclear
Challenges—limited resources for PPI
in commissioning
Power to influence Unequal between professionals and
public/lay members
Unequal between different public/lay
members
Decision-making
Status of relationships
Control Time (CCG board
public meetings)
Short of time—PPI reduced
Changes to PPI timeslot
Written public questions not always
responded to
Meeting arrangements Time, venue, frequency
Agenda setting and discussion
Leadership of meetings—staff; lay
member
Supporting PPI
Recruitment PPI CRG membership and
skills/attributes required, determined
by the CCG
Leadership of PPI CRG
PPI Impact Knowledge Capacity to influence/make a
difference
Legitimacy
Skills and experience
Value of PPI
Accountability and
feedback
Role of PPI unclear
Feedback not shared with PPI CRG
Accountability—one way
Monitoring/evaluation of PPI
Patient and Public Involvement
The original idea for this study emerged from a discussion
between a lay member of the CCG board (who was our
gatekeeper to the meetings observed) and the investigators.
Many of our research participants were lay and public members.
Subsamples of three lay members volunteered and were
subsequently involved in the design of the research, data
collection, and analysis.
Ethics
This study was granted ethical approval on 14/02/14 by the East
of Scotland Research Ethics Service.
RESULTS
Findings from our data reveal that the CCG retained power and
control over PPI in different ways.
Clinical Commissioning Group Board
Public Meetings
CCG board public meetings were intended to enable public
participation. Through open discussion, meetings would inform
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the public of service developments and provide opportunity for
questions about issues under debate. Whilst discussions about
service development took place between board members, there
appeared to be little opportunity for public participation.
Control
The CCG board controlled all the meeting and PPI arrangements
and agenda items for discussion. For one public member
there was:
a slight tendency to listen to things that fit into their agenda—
slightly [. . . ] if someone raises something pertinent, they might be
useful to the board with their knowledge then maybe they should
be following up on that rather than seeing it as “oh god, that’s
something else to do and that’s another problem you’ve given us.”
At times meetings did not feel open to public participation:
[. . . ] so if [they] think it’s not a relevant question, [they’ll] close
down quite quickly I think on the question. And [they are] very
clear of the direction [they] want to go in and I don’t know that
[they’re] terribly open to other people.
Researchers observed that public comments and questions were
“closed down” at times if they were deemed not relevant
to agenda items, if they were too subjective, or if time was
running short.
During earlier observations of meetings a time-slot was
included at the end of each agenda item for public members
to give comments and ask questions, allowing them to
comment directly on the item under current discussion. In
later observations a 10min time-slot for public questions and
comments was relocated to the very end of meetings. This meant
public members had to wait until the end of the meeting to
comment, by which time discussion of a given item had already
taken place. This was perceived by public members as a way of
“saving time”: by moving (thereby reducing) the public time-slot,
the board would have longer to discuss agenda items. One public
member commented:
The public involvement is confined to 10min at the end of the
meeting [. . . ] I think 10min for people to ask questions is certainly
nowhere near long enough.
Eventually the arrangements for public involvement changed
again. The board asked for questions to be submitted in writing
ahead of meetings; these would receive priority over verbal
questions on the day. Sometimes, however, meetings over-ran
and there was insufficient time for responses to written questions.
On these occasions, the board announced they would respond in
writing at a later date. This was seen as unhelpful by one public
member because:
[. . . ] it means all the people here [at the board public meeting]
don’t get to hear what others are concerned about and the
board’s response.
Patient and Public Involvement Clinical
Reference Group
Researchers observed two dimensions to the work of the PPI
CRG: (i) facilitating development of greater PPI across the
borough (e.g., by ensuring on-going communication with and
support for other CRGs relating to building PPI) and (ii)
supporting the CCG in gaining public feedback about healthcare
service development plans (e.g., via public consultations and
rolling out public surveys).
The PPI CRG terms of reference stated the overall purpose
of the group was to “ensure effective PPI and to deliver to the
CCG a vision for PPI.” However, the document lacked detail
and was unclear in terms of the role of group members, for
example expected achievements and who they were representing
and informing—questions that were repeatedly raised by PPI
CRG lay members during meetings.
Control
Membership to the PPI CRG was controlled by CCG staff
regarding the attributes required of new lay members, who would
occupy a leadership role and what leadership involved.
Lay members of the PPI CRG had undergone a formal
recruitment process to become members of the group. This
had involved completing and submitting an application form
and CV and attending interview with the lay chair and two or
three staff members of the group. Lay members on the whole
had previous experience and knowledge of NHS services—some
of them in a professional capacity—not only from the patient
perspective but also through involvement in other voluntary and
community groups.
During researcher observations of PPI CRG meetings two
lay members consecutively occupied the role of chair, the first
leaving the position when research observations were at an
early stage. The second chair was a lay member of the PPI
CRG and applied for the position through a formal application
process. Senior CCG board members had conducted interviews
and appointed the lay member as chair. This appointment
automatically afforded the lay member a position on the CCG
board as representative for PPI.
The interim period between the first chair leaving the role and
recruitment of the second chair was managed by staff members
of the group who took on a leadership role and chaired meetings.
This received mixed reactions from lay members who, on the one
hand, recognized and appreciated the commitment and support
of staff members. On the other hand, lay members were at times
dissatisfied with the way the group’s work and meetings were
“managed.” One lay member spoke about feeling:
[. . . ] a bit uncomfortable about the power balance between the
staff and the punters.
Notwithstanding this, lay members acknowledged the
accountability of staff members to the CCG. Part of the
staff ’s role was to provide written documents (e.g., PPI CRG
reports, with input from lay members) about the group’s work
in developing PPI across the borough. Researcher observations
noted perceptions of staff members feeling under pressure
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when deadlines for producing documents to the CCG board
were approaching.
Valuing Patient and Public Involvement
Accountability and Feedback
Laymembers expressed a need for stronger lines of accountability
in both directions between the PPI CRG and the CCG. Some
lay members felt that PPI should be audited to monitor and
facilitate progress. This would go some way to strengthening lines
of accountability, in turn enabling greater recognition, and value
to be placed on PPI:
I do bang on about outcome measurement because I always want
to have some demonstration be it qualitative or quantitative that
there is a difference being made to actions and outcomes as a
result of the conversations that we’re having.
However, during observations of PPI CRG meetings, the group
did not receive any feedback from the CCG about the work the
group had been involved in. One interviewee reported that the
only feedback the PPI CRG had received related to the group’s
written report on developing PPI. The board was interested to
know how PPI in the CCG was developing compared with other
CCGs and shared the view that PPI in the area was “far ahead
in all respects in patient and public involvement.” Lay members
expressed a need for meaningful feedback from the CCG:
We don’t get much sense when we’ve done these reports, of
has it made any difference [. . . ] We keep on trying [to make a
difference] without taking stock of whether anybody’s hearing
what we’re saying [. . . ] but it would’ve been quite nice to have
got something back from those around us about whether or not
they’ve found anything we’ve ever done of any use to them.
Patient and Public Input
Linking With the Clinical Commissioning Group
Some lay members had stronger relations with the CCG board, in
turn greater levels of input, than other lay and public members.
The Healthwatch lay representative and another Healthwatch
colleague wouldmeet with the board chair and the chief executive
approximately every couple of months “in a private forum” to
discuss any issues regarding PPI that came to the representative’s
attention outside of public meetings:
So in a sense that’s not good that the public is excluded from that
small meeting but it does help to put across the thoughts and ideas
that are coming up from the public through the Healthwatch.
They all seem to get a chance to get their message across—why
commissioning this or not commissioning that.
The PPI CRG lay chair was also able to speak informally with the
CCG board chair and chief executive:
[. . . ] all sorts of conversations take place outside the board and not
just involving me, other people have contact with staff, executives
or someone [. . . ] most of it less than formal meeting level.
The dual role of the PPI CRG lay chair, as a voting board member
also, meant they were able to “keep the PPI CRG informed of
the bigger picture” regarding the CCG’s work and to act as a link
between the two. They were also able to give comments on agenda
items under discussion at CCG board public meetings and ask
questions relating to PPI from their own perspective and/or on
behalf of other PPI CRG lay members.
The approach and involvement in the CCG of the PPI CRG
lay chair was greatly valued by staff and lay members alike. The
lay chair’s extensive knowledge and experience and the way they
were able to support the development of PPI moving forward,
was held in high regard.
Influence
Public members who attended CCG board public meetings
appeared to have considerably less input to the CCG’s work
than PPI CRG lay members. One of the reasons relates to the
way public involvement in meetings was managed. Another
possible reason was that their input may have been viewed as
less legitimate—there were no formal recruitment processes to
participation. Public members were “independent” and came
from a range of backgrounds, particularly different to the
backgrounds of PPI CRG lay members. Some public members
spoke from personal experience of healthcare services as patients
or carers, some spoke from particular political standpoints
and most had no “professional” experience of NHS structures
and processes.
There were differences in how and at what stage public and
lay members wanted to be involved in the CCG’s work and how
and when the CCG wanted them to be involved. This led to some
frustration about the type of involvement lay and public members
could or should expect to have. At times PPI CRG lay members
perceived their input as “low level”:
Some discussions have come to the [PPI] reference group for
input at an early stage [. . . ] but they tend to be slow-burning, less
high profile issues.
[. . . ] the input was looking at the types of questions that were
being asked like, “is this questionnaire okay?”
Some lay members had volunteered their involvement in a
commissioning subgroup in order to bear some influence at a
higher level, but their involvement had come to an end when,
after one meeting, the subgroup stopped meeting.
Lay members wanted to influence commissioning decisions
and for the public more broadly to do the same. However,
it was emphasized by two staff members that after “essential”
healthcare services costs were factored in by commissioners there
was very little finance remaining “to play around with.” It was
also pointed out that allocating limited resources was a significant
responsibility which involved a great deal of skill and particular
experience. Based on these restrictions, irrespective of the CCG’s
approach to PPI, this suggests public and lay members could not
have as much input to commissioning decision-making as they
believed was or should have been possible.
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Decision-Making
Researchers did not observe CCG strategic decision-making
taking place; agenda items in meetings observed tended not
to require decision-making at a strategic level either with or
without PPI. CCG board public meetings facilitated discussion
amongst board members and other staff, with some input from
public members (e.g., around hospital bed arrangements; patient
number increase and capacity to meet healthcare needs; plans
for patient self-management of clinical conditions; expenditure
issues). CRG PPI meetings tended to discuss and respond
to CCG requests to build greater PPI more broadly across
the borough.
Lay and public members expressed doubts about being heard
in a way that made a difference to CCG decision-making at a
strategic level including around procurement, commissioning,
and future priorities and developments of healthcare services:
I want to know really where people are having an influence and
making changes for the better [. . . ] but I can’t actually get a
grasp of where any of us have actually managed to influence
spending decisions.
I don’t feel we’re very influential—I really don’t.
For some, the CCG would take notice of PPI only if views
matched those of the CCG’s:
If it works in the favor of the CCG they’ll love it, otherwise they
don’t want to know.
Public members who attended CCG board public meetings felt
that this was not where decision-making in reality took place.
It was pointed out that public members were invited to ask
questions “which is great” but that:
[. . . ] decisions are obviously made somewhere behind the scenes
and they come to the board for ratification.
CCG board public meetings were viewed as a means to public
members hearing about changes to services the CCG was
planning, but that decisions around those changes had likely
already been taken.
DISCUSSION
Researchers’ observations of meetings, interviews conducted, and
informal interactions provide insight into the approach, views,
and attitudes toward and experiences of PPI in the CCG. Data
reveal there are different layers to PPI which reflect different lay
and public members’ capacity to influence the CCG’s work. These
layers form part of a hierarchy in which professionals occupy the
most powerful positions.
Researchers identified two co-existing dimensions to power.
One relates to CCG power over PPI and the other relates to
having power to influence the CCG’s work. If the CCG has
power over PPI, it is reasonable to assume this will affect
the nature and extent of PPI input. However, our findings
reveal that the different positions of individuals afford them
different levels and types of input. Our discussion below
considers power imbalances between different individuals and
the positions they occupy with regards both dimensions of
power: the power over PPI and the power to influence
CCG decision-making.
Power Over Patient and Public Involvement
Issues emerging from our study relating to imbalances of power
support findings of previous research regarding the control and
restrictions of statutory bodies over public involvement (Baker,
2007; Stern and Green, 2008; Peckham et al., 2014).
Much of the CCG’s PPI could be considered low level.
Consultation-type PPI is widely recognized as a low level form of
involvement (Hickey and Kippling, 1998; Renedo and Marston,
2011). Callaghan and Wistow (2006) found that health boards
were viewed as controlling which of its public consultation
findings to respond to and concluded that consultation is
used to confirm the dominant (professionals’) views and not
necessarily the public’s views. This corresponds with the views
of some public and lay members in our study who believed
that the CCG would act on PPI only if it corresponded with its
own plans.
Direct PPI in CCG decision-making was not evident and
neither was there feedback to the PPI CRG from the CCG
or outcome measurement of actions resulting from PPI CRG
discussions. CCG board public meetings might have intended
public participation but in reality there was relatively little. These
factors made public and lay members feel underutilized and
undervalued highlighting a further aspect of power inequalities.
Tritter’s (2009) framework for conceptualizing PPI helps us
understand the nature of PPI in our study and the power
dynamics between professionals and public/lay members. It
comprises three dimensions: direct/indirect (the degree of
direct decision-making around healthcare service development);
individual/collective (the extent that patients and public act as
sole agents or as part of a group); proactive/reactive (how much
PPI is responding to a pre-existing agenda or is helping to
shape it) (2009 p. 277). The PPI in our study can be considered
indirect (there was no evidence of direct involvement in decision-
making); it is both individual and collective (individual referring
to public members at CCG board public meetings and the PPI
CRG as the collective). Finally it is both reactive and proactive:
public members at CCG board public meetings were reactive
because of their capacity to respond only to meeting agenda
items and in allocated ways and times. The PPI CRG was
reactive in the broad context of the CCG’s PPI agenda which
determined the nature and level of involvement in the CCG’s
work. The group was proactive, however, in shaping the PPI
agenda to develop PPImore broadly across the borough. Yet even
this proactive dimension was conducted under the supervision
of the CCG through the support, leadership (at times), and
reporting back to the CCG by PPI CRG staff members. Our
findings support Tritter’s point about the power of professionals
to both influence the legitimacy of PPI and limit the type of
involvement. Professional support is both an enabler and a
restrictor (Tritter, 2009).
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Power to Influence: A Stratified System
The varying degrees of power held by different individuals to
influence the CCG’s work reflect a system of stratification.
Kerckhoff (2001) makes a useful distinction between
stratification as a condition and as a process:
Social stratification as a condition refers to the fact that members
of a population have characteristics that differentiate them into
levels or strata. Social stratification as a process refers to the ways
in which members of a population become stratified (Kerckhoff,
2001, p. 3).
In our study, social stratification as a condition relates to the
differences in knowledge, qualifications, and experience between
professionals and lay members. As a process it relates to how the
CCG decides the type and level of PPI afforded to public and
lay members.
The stratification system constitutes a hierarchy of power.
Different positions occupied by professionals and public and
lay members reflect different levels of power ownership. Power
imbalances existed not only between professionals and lay
members (although this distinction was the most pronounced),
but also amongst different CCG staff and board members and
amongst different lay members (Figure 1).
Situated at the top, occupying the most powerful position,
were the CCG’s 15 voting members. These included two lay
members: the PPI CRG chair, and a lay member for governance.
Non-voting board members occupied a position below voting
members; one of these was the Healthwatch representative. By
virtue of sitting on the board, non-voting members nonetheless
had the resources to give input and raise questions. Together with
other staff members (managers and colleagues) not on the board
they were accountable to voting board members when producing
service development proposals for approval.
Further down the hierarchy were the CRGs. Within the
PPI CRG itself a sub-stratification system or hierarchy existed,
starting at the upper end occupied by the lay chair and staff
members. The lay chair was a voting CCG board member which
automatically afforded a more prominent position, not least
by having direct access to CCG board members. They were
also involved in separate, smaller meetings with board members
outside of CCG board public meetings. Staff members occupied
a position somewhere in between the lay chair and other lay
members of the group: they were not members of the board but
they chaired PPI CRG meetings when there was no lay chair in
post. In liaison with the lay chair, they also regulated PPI CRG
meetings and agendas.
Other lay members sat on the lower end of the PPI CRG
sub-stratification system. They did not have equal access to, or
involvement with, CCG board members in comparison to the lay
chair and staff members. The privileged position of the lay chair
as a CCG board voting member combined with the wider group’s
involvement in developing broader PPI, its written reports and
other tasks requested by the CCG, meant that the PPI CRG as
a whole occupied a higher position in the hierarchy than other
types of public involvement observed.
FIGURE 1 | Hierarchy of CCG staff and public/lay member involvement.
In the lower echelons of the hierarchy was involvement
from public members who attended CCG board public meetings
but whose participation had less potential to influence the
CCG’s work.
Situated at the bottom of the hierarchy were members of
public who did not sit on committees, belong to a formal CRG
or attend CCG board public meetings, but took part in CCG
public activities, for example consultations. On the one hand,
these members of public had least capacity to influence the CCG’s
work. On the other hand it is possible that public consultations
bore some influence on discussions around service development.
However, researchers did not observe decision-making taking
place. Neither were the CCG’s public consultations findings
accessed. Without these data we can neither confirm nor refute
this point.
Overall, what we see is an example of a hierarchy of power
in which, predictably, professionals occupy positions at the top
and public members at the bottom. However, we suggest this
system has complex dimensions. The dual or overlapping roles
of lay members and professionals place them simultaneously on
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different hierarchical levels. For example the lay chair occupies a
position near the top as a voting board member, whilst also being
a lay member of the PPI CRG which occupies a lower position.
Similarly, staff members of the PPI CRG occupy the same
hierarchical position as lay members. Yet as CCG employees with
access to senior professionals, and who to a large extent lead and
make decisions about the PPI CRG, they also occupy a higher
status than their lay member colleagues of the same group.
The hierarchy also demonstrates how positions occupied
reflect both the individual and collective dimensions of Tritter’s
model at the same time. Also in relation to Tritter’s model,
PPI in CCG board public meetings is at an individual level
and at the lower end of the hierarchy while PPI CRG lay
members function at a collective level and are positioned higher
up. The lay chair of the (collective) PPI CRG, however, is also
involved at an individual level but occupies one of the highest
positions in the hierarchy. This indicates that having greater or
lesser influence is not determined by whether involvement is
individual or collective. Further, the only individuals with direct
involvement in decision-making are CCG board staff members.
Other individuals’ involvement may best be described as indirect.
Structure and Power
The structure and organization of PPI in the CCG was an
important factor in governing the flow of power. In order to help
inform our interpretations of this finding it is useful to draw on
theoretical perspectives.
Power is a core theoretical construct in the field of sociology.
It has been a key area of interest in sociological analysis and
the impact of power relations on individuals, groups, and
organizations over many years.
Paradigms have naturally evolved and shifted in sociology
from the 1960s to current day. During the 1960s structural
functionalism was a dominant theoretical perspective which
attracted critics (e.g., symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer) for
its emphasis on maintaining social orderliness within social and
cultural structures, sustaining pre-existing social inequalities and
the power of established elite groups. In structural functionalist
theory, social stratification is a functional necessity. Stratification
as a structure refers to a system of positions (as opposed to
individuals in the stratification system) which contain different
levels of status. Symbolic interactionism theory criticized the
model of structural functionalism for its disregard of individual
creativity and micro-level social processes (Cockerham, 2013).
The realm of symbolic interactionism helps to identify the
important interaction between structure, culture and action, and
provides significant understanding into the relational nature
of power, not only in terms of macro structures but also
with regard to micro structures and the individual roles that
people play within more established organized structures. It
is widely recognized that social structures can fashion and
influence social interactions and that social interactions can
influence, reproduce, and sometimes alter social structures (e.g.,
Giddens, 1984; Turner, 1992). Established structures, such as
macro structures like health organizations, have the potential to
promote actions and behaviors among individuals which in turn
promotes them to form and continue relationships or affiliations
with the dominant structure.
The post-structuralism movement acknowledges the
importance of structures. Theorist Michel Foucault, widely
associated with post-structuralism, focuses on power and
specifically the link between knowledge and power within such
structures. Foucault (1980) describes hierarchical bodies and
powerful social and cultural structures as having far-reaching,
controlling impacts, stretching out and working through every
situation in which individuals find themselves (Clark, 2010).
Foucault’s work reflects how dominant groups, professions
and organizations can control agendas to promote or protect
their dominance.
The structure and organization of PPI in the CCG reflects
a top-down model in which the CCG (the macro structure) is
the dominant system and PPI represents social processes at the
micro level. The CCG is formed of a board of members which
largely comprises medical professionals. Other professionals such
as directors and managers of various services also make up
board membership. In keeping with Foucault’s perspective of
power residing in medical structures, institutions and discourses,
our findings indicate that the professional status of CCG board
members, or the CCG as a structure, places professionals at the
top of the hierarchy affording them power over all aspects of
the CCG’s work. The status of professionals gives them power as
professionals in the realm of healthcare services and provisions.
Lay and public members, in contrast, are not professionals in this
realm; they are recipients of healthcare services and provisions.
Attempts are made by the CCG to work collaboratively with lay
and public members, but ultimately the professionals represent
the dominant structure.
Features of the dominant structure are apparent such as
centralized decision-making which appeared to be taking place
behind doors that were closed to the public. Although meetings
observed were not overly bureaucratic, the CCG board also
controlled arrangements around PPI, exemplified for example
by the CCG board in public meetings determining when the
public could speak, what they could speak about and for how
long. By controlling PPI, the status quo is maintained. However,
this is not to say the CCG maintained such a level of control in
order to promote or protect its dominance. Such an organization
with responsibility for making impactful and complex decisions
around healthcare service provision would need a level of social
orderliness in order to achieve outcomes necessary to provide a
service that meets bureaucratic and practical demands.
In theory, the structural model of PPI meetings potentially
offered a more collaborative approach to the work of the CCG.
In theory, our study was potentially observing a decentralized
model through which the public could have strategic input
into local healthcare service development. Yet in reality a
centralized system governed, facilitating a hierarchy in which
the right of the CCG to determine strategy continued largely
unchallenged. Lay members showed on-going commitment and
support toward (or at the very least involvement in) the work of
the CCG which might somewhat reflect a propensity to reinforce
power structures through their already established affiliation with
the organization.
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Holders of Knowledge
Findings indicate a relationship between knowledge and power
when it comes to who can become involved in the work of
the CCG, at what level and the extent of influence individuals
can have. Foucault’s critique of dominant power and knowledge
and the disparities between those who possess these resources
(professionals) and those who do not (non-professionals) is
particularly relevant.
The many different sources and types of knowledge around
healthcare [e.g., clinicians’, patients/carers’, research or evidence-
based (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2004)] do not receive equal
status and give rise to battles over power and control between
competing forms (Shortall, 2012) with professionals questioning
the legitimacy of public knowledge (Callaghan and Wistow,
2006). Gibson et al. (2012) emphasize that lay people even on
committees are not seen as equal as they do not have the same
access to resources as professionals. Whilst our study showed
no evidence of professionals questioning the legitimacy of lay
members, the more marginal role of lay members in the work
of the CCG suggests an unequal balance of potential to influence
and ultimately of power between professionals and lay members.
The issue of power imbalances between the different groups
of individuals involved in the CCG can be explained by
ownership of particular resources, relating to Gibson et al.’s point.
CCG board members have professional status. The resources
they possess include professional qualifications, knowledge, and
expertise. It is ownership of these resources that determines
professionals’ positions, and it is through these relative positions
that they establish levels of power greater than that of other CCG
staff and lay and public members. Other CCG staff members
possess qualifications, knowledge and expertise but in different
areas and at different levels to board member professionals. Lay
and public members may also have qualifications, knowledge and
expertise but again in areas different to those of the CCG board
and to other staff members and, importantly, with less relevance
to the CCG’s work. When it comes to power imbalances—or
more precisely differences in levels of influence—between lay and
public members, the former are perhaps viewed as having greater
legitimacy because of the particular resources (knowledge, skills,
experience, and in some lay members, professionalism) they
bring to the CCG. Procedures for recruitment to the PPI CRG
suggest that lay members were “cherry-picked” on the basis of
these resources. Power imbalances ultimately relate not only to
the professional status of individuals and the level and type of
resources they possess, but also to perceptions of the legitimacy
and relevance of those resources to the CCG’s work, and to the
access of other individuals to the more powerful professionals.
The position of individuals in the CCG hierarchy is
largely governed by professionals’ perceptions of lay members’
knowledge and based on what type of knowledge is valued. This
affords some lay members a higher status (as in the case of
the lay chair) but not equal to that of the professionals due to
the relativity of the positions they occupy. Where lay people
are metaphorically placed is determined by those in positions
of power (the professionals) because it is they who control
PPI. As Callaghan and Wistow (2006) emphasize, barriers to
power-sharing include the beliefs held by professionals about
what participation can contribute. A higher position in the CCG
hierarchy might enable different PPI and even a greater level of
involvement, but does not necessarily translate into a system of
equality between the professionals and non-professionals when it
comes to influencing the work of the CCG.
LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS
A main aim of our study was to explore PPI in CCG
decision-making. However, we were unable to yield data relating
specifically to this due to CCG arrangements around decision-
making and around PPI which appeared not to combine the
two. It is important at this point to note, though, that our study
focused on two particular areas in which there was PPI and
not all CCG PPI activities; exploration of other PPI activities
may have generated different findings. One way of potentially
establishing PPI in strategic decision-making would have been
through accessing data from CCG public consultations. These
data would then have needed to be compared with decisions
the CCG had subsequently taken on the same issues that public
consultations addressed, thus becoming more of an evaluation of
PPI than an exploration.
A further issue relates to the scale of the study. As a single case
study, generalizations about the commissioning arrangements of
other CCGs on a national and international level are limited.
Themajority of data relating to power derived from researcher
observations of meetings and from interviews with public and lay
members. Relatively little came from staff interviews. However,
the data yielded provide insight into how two types of PPI activity
operated in a CCG in England and the views and experiences of
many individuals involved.
Contemplating PPI in the context of a stratification system
helps us understand the relative position and value accorded to
PPI, the different layers to PPI and the levels and types of PPI
within those layers. It is appropriate to acknowledge, however,
that the hierarchy we present here comprises only those groups
and individuals that we observed and conducted interviews
with. There would indisputably be other groups and individuals
within the CCG (staff and lay members) who would also occupy
positions in the hierarchy; it is not by any means exhaustive.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We suggested in our introduction that modern day changes
to the way healthcare services are sought, delivered and have
facilitated the growth of PPI might have narrowed the power gap
between professionals and lay and public members. Consistent
with theory and previous research, however, our findings
support the premise that professionals hold the most power
and therefore continue to dominate; PPI is unable to permeate
healthcare commissioning and procurement at an equal level.
PPI might have become more integrated into healthcare service
development but it still has less status than that of professionals,
hence the potency of PPI remains questionable.
The main facilitator of PPI in our study relates to the support
provided by the CCG in terms of the functioning of various
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PPI activities and groups, and the provision of staff and admin
support. The barriers to PPI are less tangible but are linked to
the legitimacy of public knowledge, an issue that has been widely
referred to as restricting effective involvement (e.g., Martin,
2008b; Barnes and Schattan Coelho, 2009; Renedo et al., 2015).
It is knowledge (the legitimacy of which is determined by the
CCG) and recruitment (which is controlled by the CCG), which
are interlinked, that appear to determine where individuals in our
study sit in the hierarchy.
We suggest that another related factor of substantial
importance when it comes to PPI and power to influence is
communication. Effective and on-going communication between
public and lay members and professionals could generate greater
potential to make public and lay members feel more valued.
It could also, importantly, facilitate clarity on all individuals’
expectations of the type and level of PPI. An overall more
collaborative approach to developing a PPI role which meets the
expectations of patients, public, and professionals might go some
way toward reducing the power gap between them.
Previous research highlights the need for formal evaluation
or monitoring of PPI whilst also underlining associated
complexities (e.g., Staniszewska et al., 2011; Brett et al., 2012;
Petsoulas et al., 2014). Evaluation would facilitate greater
understanding of the strengths of PPI and areas where it could
be further developed, in turn enabling greater potential for PPI
to have a direct influence on strategic decision-making. In this
sense, evaluation of PPI could be an important contribution to
narrowing the power disparity between professionals and public
and lay members.
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